





Changes in macroeconomic policy have had un-
expected consequences in recent years. The move
to floating exchange rates among industrial coun-
tries in 1973 may not have led to the predicted
greater policy independence among countries, nor
did it completely insulate countries from real and
monetary disturbances emanating from abroad.
Indeed, some studies have found that monetary
growth rates and interest rates across countries have
become more, rather than less, correlated since the
change to floating exchanges rates. 1 As a result, we
have learned more about how alternative exchange
rate systems change the nature of real and financial
interrelationships and the channels by which shocks
and policy changes spill over from one country to
another. This article will explore some of these
international linkages.
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve changed
monetary control procedures to one that de-empha-
sized the need to target interest rates to influence
monetary growth and which placed more emphasis
on the control of bank reserves. An unexpected
consequence was the increased level and volatility
ofnominal interest rates in the United States. Some
increased volatility in the federal funds rate was
anticipated, but the new behavioroflong-term U.S.
interest rates was not. They appeared to become
more sensitive to movements in short-term rates. It
is, of course, debatable whether the unexpected
interest rate behaviorwas directly attributable to the
change in monetary control procedures, but the
coincidence was surprising.
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The level of both real and nominal interest rates
in the U.S. following October 1979, together with a
renewed anti-inflationary objective of the Federal
Reserve, caused some international agencies to at-
tribute the high level of world interest rates since
1980 to u.s. policies. As an example, the 1982
Annual Report ofthe Bank for International Settle-
ments states:
"Nonetheless, it can be argued that without
the American influence, nominal and real in-
terest rates. in two major countries at least-
Japan and the Federal Republic ofGermany-
would, in the spring of 1982, have been at
levels more consistent with the requirements
ofdomestic balance."
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One implication of the BIS concern is that a
major rise in U.S. interest rates could lead to a
policy conflict between domestic and external bal-
ances in other large industrial countries. In response
to a large rise in U.S. interest rates, a foreign coun-
try can permit its exchange rate to adjust, or allow
domestic interest rates to adjust and leave the ex-
change rate unchanged. However, both exchange
rates and interest rates are asset prices and are
strongly influenced by expectations, particularly
expectations of the future value of the currency.
Thus, not changing domestic interest rates after
foreign interest rates have changed can result in a
large exchange rate movement. This movement de-
pends upon expectations of the currency's future
value which, in tum, is heavily influenced by pri-
vate market expectations ofpublic policy. Acentral
bank's concern with the private market's expecta-
tion ofthe long-run value ofa currency can be seen
in the following statementby G. Thiessen regarding
the Bank of Canada's response to a rise in u.S.
interest rates:
" ...it is useful to look at the options facing
the Bank ofCanada when, for example, thereis asnarp riseinsnort-tenn U.S. interestrates.
If the policyresponse is to maintain Canadian
interest rates unchanged, the Canadian dollar
would come under downward pressure. In a
potentially inflationary situation, the appear-
ance of benign neglect toward the exchange
rate by the authorities would risk a substantial
overshooting oftheexchange rate decline. The
less firmly held are the market expectations
about the future value of the currency, the
greater the overshooting is likely to be;"
(emphasis ourS)3
We conjecture that linkages between short-tenn
rates in the U.S. and longer-tenn rates abroad de-
pend on what private market participants in the
financial markets assume to be the long-tenn ex-
change rate objectives of the central bank. Given
the rapid rise in U.S. nominal and real interest rates
afterOctober 1979, and the increased strength ofthe
U.S. dollar in the foreign exchange markets, for-
eign central banks had to consider two prospects:
that of moving their short-tenn rates, over which
they have some control, into line with U.S. rates, or
observing a majordepreciation oftheir currency.
Since a depreciation of the currency for a very
open economy can lead to rapid increases in domes-
tic prices, the policy question ofwhether to adopt a
strong exchange rate "objective" is similar to con-
fronting the short-run inflation-output trade-off
question. Ifa foreign country should raise interest
rates in response to a major rise in U.S. rates, it
would risk reducing real output. Alternatively, if it
chooses to pennit its exchange rate to depreciate, it
would face more inflation, at least in the short run.
A country that moves its short-rates to prevent a
currency devaluation may find that the U.S. short
rates strongly influence expected short-tennrates in
its domestic financial markets because foreign short
rates contain useful infonnation in fonning expecta-
tions about future domestic short-tenn interest
rates. In this manner, a country's entire tenn struc-
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ture of interest rates may move in response to a
change in U.S. short-tenn rates.
Purpose and Organization
How short-tenninterestrates in the U.S. , priorto
and after the change in U.S. monetary control pro-
cedures, affect interest rates along their entire tenn
structure for Canada and the Federal Republic of
Gennany. is the major empirical concern of this
study. Investigating these relationships requires that
we briefly review two areas ofeconomic theory, the
expectations hypothesis of the tennstructure of
interest rates and the asset market approach to ex-
change rate detennination. These two areas are re-
lated via the international arbitrage of financial
assets which results in movements in interest rates
and exchange rates that equalize expected rates of
return on financial assets with similar underlying
risk characteristics, regardless of their currency of
denomination. These financial interrelationships
can then create policy interdependencies. Policy
interdependencies and conflictbetween internal and
external policy objectives can better be understood
when, as this paper will attempt, we consider how
interest rate movements in one country are trans-
mitted along the maturity spectrum ofinterest rates
ofits financial, interdependent foreign partners.
This paper is organized as follows: Section I will
briefly review the expectations hypothesis of the
tenn structure of interest rates. Section II will de-
scribe an asset market approach to exchange rate
expectations equilibrium and how long-tenn inter-
est rates are related to private market expectations
ofcentral banks' exchange rate objectives. Section
III will review exchange rate behavior for Canada
and Gennany in relation to the U.S. dollar since the
introduction of the new Federal Reserve monetary
control procedures. The fourth section will statis-
tically test the impactofchanges in U.S. short-tenn
interest rates on the maturity spectrum of interest
rates in the Federal Republic ofGennany and Can-
ada. Section V provides a summary and considers
policy implications ofthe study.I. The Expectations Hypothesis of the Term Structure
(3)
n-l
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where v is a stochastic errorterm. Firstdifferencing
(2) yields
Written in this form the term structure equations
state that the change in the long-term bond rate in
period t depends on the current change in the short
rate andpreviouschanges in the short-termrate. Itis
this latter implication which is currently in dispute.
That is, it is argued that only new information (or
ances. Demands for such items as long-term house-
hold assets, such as housing, or business capital
assets are often conjectured to be determined.by
"long-term interest. rates. ." A term structure. rela-
tionship, which .defines the long-term bond rate as
dependent on the current and past short-term inter-
est rates, is often treated as a "structural" relation-
ship in empirically estimated models and .is esti-
mated by the regressionofthe long rate on adistrib-
uted lag ofshort-term interest rate~.
A recent criticism of the standard empirically
implemented term structure relationship is that it
cannot be taken to be a structural economic rela-
tionship with fixed coefficients. As emphasized by
a number of critics of the standard expectations
approach to the term structure, the expectations
described in Equation (I) are conditional on policy
rules, and hence, the expectations structure will
change if there is a change in the policy rule or an
expected change in the policy rule. Such "policy
rules" may involve domestic monetary control
rules or exchange rate intervention rules. In any
case, the relationship between the long-term bond
rate and short-term rates is argued to be crucially
dependent on both monetary and fiscal rules. Since
part of the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy to the real economydepends on how changes
in policy feed to the long-term segment ofthe term
structure, the role ofthe policy rules in affecting this
relationship is of considerable importance to
policymakers .6
Consider a typical term-structure equation ofthe
following form
n
R, =.:2: cjr, ~i + v, (2)
1=0
Simply stated, the expectations hypothesis ofthe
term structureofinterest rates suggests that individ-
uals arbitrage financial assets (bonds) of varying
maturities and that this.results in an "equilibrium"
in which the (known) return on a long-term bond
equals the average of the return on an available
short-term bond and the expected returns on future
short-term bonds over the same holding period.
This hypothesis implies that bonds oflike risk char-
acteristics, but different maturities, are goodsubsti-
tutes for one another. Hence, theiraverage expected
return over a given time horizon should be approx-
imately equal.
Formally, the term-structure relationship as of
period t between the yield on an n-period discount
bond, R, and the yield on one-period bonds, r, is
often written:
R, == ft E,(r,+r'+1 + ... +r,+0_111,). (I)
This equation is written as an approximation
since the original relationship is multiplicative,
with the approximation being that In( 1+r)=r. This
relationship must be modified ifthe bonds are cou-
pon-bearing, in which case the long-rate would be a
weighted, and not a simple, average ofcurrent and
expected future short-term interest rates. The sym-
bol E denotes that the relationship requires the ex-
plicit specification of how expectations offuture
short-term rates are formed, conditioned on some
set of information I available at time t.
4 This infor-
mation set is assumed to include the policy rule of
the central bank.
Equation (I) is often empirically implemented by
regressing the level of the long-term bond rate on
the levels of current and past short-term interest
rates. One argument for the use of past short-term
interest rates as explanatory variables is that a fore-
cast offuture short-term rates can be formed by an
appropriate weighting of past interest rates.
5 The
structure ofthe weights on past short-term interest
rates depends, in theory, on the stochastic structure
ofshort-term interest rates and the economic struc-
ture (e.g., the monetary control regime) determin-
ing the short-rate.
Most formal textbook macroeconomic models
"determine" one interest rate, usually that which
influences the public's desire to hold money bal-
9"surprises'') shouldchangethe long-term rate. Pre-
viously available information, such as the level of
short-term rates, or their changes, should not cause
the current long-term rate to change; such previous
information is presumablyalreadycaptured in RH .
Having said this, we must note that it may be an
overly strong statement, not completely supported
by the theoretical literature on the determination of
the term structure interest rate under the assumption
of rational expectations.
7 For our purposes, it is
sufficientto say that we expectthe coefficienton the
most recentchange in the short-rate, co' to dominate
all othercoefficientson pastchanges in the short-rate.
The basic point of the above argument is that if
individuals form their expecations in (I) in an effi-
cient manner, that is, by exploiting all available
information, any information that was available
"yesterday" should not cause security prices to
change "today," ifthe movement in the short-rate
follows a random walk. Similarly, only information
that was unavailable "yesterday" should cause the
long-term bond yield to change "today." Techni-
cally, changes in past short-term rates may affect
the change in the current long-term rate in an effi-
cient market if the short-rate does not follow a
random walk. Forourpurposes, it is only necessary
to assume that most of the movement in the long-
rate will be due to the current change in the short-
rate, thatis, the short-rate is close to arandom walk.
Ourtesting ofthe international interrelationships
between long- and short-term interest rates thus
mustacknowledge current criticism ofthe standard
expectational statement ofthe term-structure ofin-
terest rates. These criticisms, to repeat, are that: (I)
the term-structure relationshipcannotbe considered
a" structural" macroeconomic relationship, since
such an interpretation is not consistent with the
assumption that capital markets are "efficient"; (2)
the relationship between long- and short-term inter-
est rates (both within and between countries) de-
pends on the policy rule, which will influence the
formation of expectations of future short-term in-
terest rates; and (3) "new information," such as
contemporaneous change in short-term rates,
should dominate past information in causing long-
term interest rates to vary. Point (3) simply says that
the long-term bond rate moves quickly to reflect
fully any new information. In our empirical work
we will begin by assuming that past changes in
short-term interest rates do not significantly explain
the contemporaneous changes in the long-term
interest rate.
II. Asset Markets and the Term Structure of
Exchange Rate Expectations
Iffinancial assets in Germany and the U.S. were
reasonably good substitutes and the U.S. and Ger-
many were to agree to fix their bilateral exchange
rate, short-term interest rates in the two countries
would be identical by reason ofinterest rate parity.
The long-term interest rate in Germany could then
be said to be a function of expected future short-
term rates in either country, and the exchange rate
system would determine this dependency. The
German central bank could also create the impres-
sion that it desired a long-run exchange rate objec-
tive in the absence of a formal agreement with the
u.S. Itcould intervene periodically in the exchange
market, or reposition its short-term interest rates in
line with movements in U.S. short-term rates. In
either case, U.S. short-term interest rates again
would likely be significant in explaining German
long-term bond rates.
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The above example illustrates what should be an
obvious interrelationship: long-term bond rates in
country A will be influenced by movements in
short-term rates in country Bonly ifthe central bank
of country A is perceived as having a long-run
desired exchange rate objective in relation to the
currency of country B. Interest rate interrelation-
ships between two countries depend on the extent to
which the two central banks will not permit their
bilateral exchange rate to move away from some
desired level. To see the formal interrelationship of
short- and long-term rates between countries, we
begin by reviewing some theory on the term struc-
ture ofexchange rates.
Just as in the standard term structure of interest
rate argument, an arbitrage relationship holds for
assets of identical maturity but different currency
of denomination in exchange rate term structurewhere the small s denotes the log of the exchange
rate, S. Equation (5) states that arbitrage will force
the yield differential between two similar assets of
like maturitybutdifferentcurrencyofdenomination
to equal the expected average annual change in the
exchange rate.
Equation (5) is an arbitrage condition. It cannot
be interpreted as implying that interest rates cause
exchange rate changes, or the reverse. This arbi-
trage condition depends on a statementofexchange
rate expectations. As stated in Equation (5), the
exchange rate in period t expected to hold in period
t+ndependsonsomesetofinformationavailable in
period t.
To derive a relationship between long-term rates
in one country andshort-term rates inanothercoun-
try, we can beginbycombining the two interest rate
arbitrage conditions discussed above, defined in
Equations (I) and (5). Solving Equation (5) for R,
and equating this to Equation (I), we have for R~,
the foreignn-period bondrate:
R* = 1 [E,(r,+r'+I+'" +rt+n_III,)
, n (6)
(E,(s,+nII,) - s,) ]
Equation (6) states that the foreign (n-period) long-
term rate is equal in equilibrium to the average of
current.and·e:x;pected future .domestic Short4erm
interestrates less the averageexpectedchangeinthe
excha.l1gerateovertheexistingmaturityofthebond.
Equation (6) is the statement of two arbitrage
conditions and cannot be empirically estimated until
the hypothesis ofhow expectations offuture short-
term rates in the "domestic"· economy and the
future exchange rate are made explicit. The two
components ofthe long-term "foreign" bond rate
are expectational variables. The set of information
which conditions these expectations will have a
good deal to say about the form of the estimating
equation and the assumed stability ofthat equation
to changes in policy rules.
To empirically use Equation (6), we first assume
that it is a stochastic relationship; that is, arbitrage
will make the long-term bond rate approximately
consistent with the two expectations. Second, we
assume that informing expectations ofjuture short·
term interest rates, it is primarily information
unavailable in the previous period thatwill signifi-
cantly change the current long-term interest rate.
International financial arbitrage implies that expec-
tations offuture domestic interest rates will depend
on expectations of foreign rates and the expected
changes in the exchange rate. We, therefore,also
assume that expectations ofexchange rate change,
particularly short-run expectations, depend on
perceptions of the exchange rate policy of the
central bank.
Equation (6) may be rewritten to show more
clearly how the "foreign" long-term rate is linked
toexpectedfuture" domestic" short-term ratesplus
the expected future short-term (period-by-period)
exchange rate changes. Consider the expected ex-
changeratechangein equation(6); it is obviousthat
E,(s'+nII,)-s, = EJ(s'+I-s,) + (S'+2-St+I) + ... +
(7)
(s,+n-s,+n_l) II,]
That is, the expected change in the exchange rate
between period t and period t+n given information
availableattime t is equaltothe sumofthe expected
changes for each intervening period. Using this
(5) R,
theory. Again, in equilibrium, the assets' risk-
adjusted expected returns should be equal in the
absence oftransaction costs. Considerthe relation-
shipbetweenthe returns ontwon-periodbonds, one
denominated in the domestic currency and one de-
nominatedinaforeigncurrency. Forthe tworeturns
to be equivalent in equilibrium, the compounded
yield differentialbetween the two securities should
exactly equal the expected change in the rate at
which the two currencies can be traded, that is, the
expectedchange in the exchange rate. We can write
this relationship as follows:
( I+~)n = E,(SS+nII,) (4)
I+R, ,
where a star indicates the foreign variable. In (4), S
is the spot exchange rate, the domestic currency
priceofa unit ofthe foreign currency. RandR*, the
market yields on the domestic and foreign bonds,
respectively, are defined in decimal units, for ex-
ample, 0.05. The numerator on the right-hand side
of Equation .(4) is the expected exchange rate n
periods hence, given information available in peri-
od t. Let us rewrite Equation (4) by first taking logs
and using the approximation In(l + R)=R:
R* = E,(s'+nII,) - S, ,
n
IIfact, we can rewrite Equation (6) using (7), as:
R~ = ~tE, [r, - (S'+I - s,)+
r'+1 - (S't2 S'+I) + ... + (8)
r,+n_1 - (s,+n - s,+n_l) II, ]}
Equation (8) states that the long-term, n-period,
bond rate in, say, Germany, is equal to the average
ofthe expectedfuture short-term interestrates in the
U.S., plus expectedexchange rate changes between
OM and the U.S. doHar. The long-term bond rate in
Germany thus captures both expectations offuture
U.S. short rates and future movements in the ex-
change rate.
H is the potential for central bank action to pre-
vent the exchange rate from moving that is useful in
forming expectations about future German short-
term rates. Expectedfuture changes in the exchange
rate depend on perceptions of the exchange rate
objectives ofthe central bank. Ifthe central bank is
perceived not to have any exchange rate objective,
short-term interest rate movements in the United
States would convey no information forthe German
bond market independent of the current German
short-term rate. In such a case, expected move-
ments in the exchange rate and U.S. rates would be
extraneous information; all the relevantinformation
would be capturedin the currentGerman short-term
rates. If, on the otherhand, the Germancentral bank
is perceived to have some exchange rate objective,
U.S. interest rates, as signals of potential future
interest rate movements initiated by the German
central bank, would contain useful information to
the German bond market.
The expectation in Equation (8) is conditioned
on some information set 1. This information set
includes the assumed policy rule ofthe central bank
and some knowledgeofthe central bank'sexchange
rate objectives. Changes in these objectives would
alter the way unanticipated changes in U.S. rates
affect German long-term rates.
Since the components on the right side are noth-
ing more than current and expected future German
short-term interest rates, conditional on current
information, we argue that these expectations will
change in response to changes in the current Ger-
man short rate and unanticipated movements III
U.S. short rates. That is:
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(9)
Equation (9) suggests that onlynew and/orunantic-
ipated information will alter expected future
German short-term rates and, by implication, the
current long-term bond rate. The ZUS variable rep-
resents the unanticipated component in U.S. short-
term interest rates. Since (9) holds for aH future
periods, with coefficients differing for different
future periods, we can rewrite an approximation to
Equation (8) in first difference form as:
Ll * _ * AUS R , - ao + al Llr ,+ a2Z, + w, (10)
This formulation tests, for example, whether Ger-
man bond holders perceive the Germancentral bank
as following an exchange rate rule and, hence, as
partially dependent on U.S. central bank interest
rate policy. Sucha dependence would be revealed in
the significance of the coefficient on the unantici-
pated component of U.S. short-term interest rates,
a2. Analogously, Equation (10) can be estimatedfor
the changes in U.S. long-term rates as dependent,
for example, on the change in U.S. short-rates and
the unanticipated change in German short-rates.
We wiH estimate Equation (10) with changes in
Canadian and German long-term bond rates depen-
dent on, respectively, changes in Canadian and
German short-term rates and the "surprise" or un-
expected movement in U.S. short-term rates. And
we will reverse the relationship to see whether the
long-term U.S. bond market used unexpected
changes in foreign short-term rates as information
variables in forming expectations about future U.S.
short-term rates.8
If the German short-term rate were found to be
statistically significant in (10), and the unantici-
pated U.S. short-term rate not, we could assume
that holders oflong-term German bonds are reveal-
ing theirexpectationthatthe Germancentral bank is
following a policy that is at least partially indepen-
dent ofU.S. monetary policy-independent in the
sense thatthe Germancentralbankis allowing some
flexibility in exchange rate movements. If, on the
other hand, U.S. short-term interest rates were also
statistically significant in explaining German long-
term bond rates, the holders of long-term German
bonds would be revealing their expectation that the
Bundesbank may have a long-run exchange rateobjective with regard to the U.S. dollar. Strong
"Ieaning-against-the-wind" exchange rate policy
could be detected in the coefficient in the U.S.
interest rate variable.
Since our equation will be estimated in first-
differenced form, wearguethatthecurrentchanges
in the short-term rate should be the primary expla-
nation for movements in the long-term bond rate.
Forthisreason, we do not includelaggedshort-term
interest rates as explanatory variables.
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One final empirical approximation is made
to implement equation (10). We assume that only
unanticipated changes in U.S. short-term interest
rates affect German and Canadian bond rates. As an
approximation for this unanticipated change in
the U.S. short-term rate, we regressed the U.S.
three-month Treasury bill rate on itself, lagged one
and two periods, and treated the estimated resid-
uals from this equation as our unanticipated U.S.
short-rate variable. This unanticipated U.S. inter-
est rate variable is defined as Z. (Alternative
methods of deriving this "sllrprise" variaple did
not appear to make a significant difference in the
empirical results.)
Evidence that long-term German bond holders
should be concerned with Bundesbank exchange
rate policy can be obtained from statements by
the German central bank regarding its exchange
rate intentions.
"But the Bundesbank has not been under any
obligation to intervene against the U.S. dollar
since the Spring .• of 1973. However, the
Bundesbank has intervened in the dollar
market ever since the dollar rate was freed,
largely to smooth out erratic day-to-dayex-
change rate fluctuations andso maintain order-
ly market conditions. In addition, ..the
Bundesbank has on occasion intervened more
heavily in the foreign exchange markets in an
attempt· to curb exaggerated exchange rate
movements and thus ease the adjustment pres-
sure on the economy." 10, II
Ifholders ofGerman bonds perceive the German
central bank to be running an independent monetary
policy with no overriding exchange rate objective.
only changes in German short-term interest rates
should contribute to changes in longer-term Ger-
man interest rates. However, ifthe German central
bank does have a major exchange rate objective,
movements in foreign (for example, U.S.) short-
term interest rates contain important information
aboutjUture German short-term rates. In this man-
ner, movements in U.S. short-term rates can affect
foreign long-term rates.
III. The Ter.m·Structure of Exchange Rate Expectations
Shortly after the Federal Reserve's change in
monetary control operating procedures, a major
policy dilemmaemerged.Thecause ofthe dilemma
was the major, andlargely unexpected, rise in both
short- and long-terrri U.S. interest rates.Thenature
ofthe dilemmafor foreign centralbankswas wheth-
er to raise their domestic interest rates orto permit
their exchange rates to depreciate.
The U.S. 3-month Treasury bill rate averaged
10.26 percent in September 1979. It rose after the
change in monetary control procedures ofOctober
6, 1979, and, as seen in Chart I, continued to rise to
a monthly average high of 15.20 percent by March
1980 before credit controls were imposed. Con-
siderably more surprising than the behavior of
short-term rates was the level to which long-term
rates rose. Some economists had anticipated that a
switch to a reserve control procedure by the Fed
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would result in a "decoupling" of interest rates.
Short-rates were expected to rise due to a more
stringent supply of bank reserves but, some
thought, long-term rates would be stable since they
were thought to be influenced primarily by infla-
tionary expectations.
Instead, long-term rates rose by over 300 basis
points in six months, from a monthly average of
9.33 percent in September 1979 to 12.75 percent in
March 1980, for the U.S. Treasury'sten-year con-
stallt maturity bond rate. While both short- and
long-tel1Jl r;:ites fell sharply after the imposition of
creditsontrolinthe spriflgof 1980, bothrosesharp-
ly after the removal otcont[()l and surpassed their
March highs byDecember1980.
The extent.to which there might have been any
linkage between U.S. short-term rates on the one
hand and German and Canadian long-term rates onthe other depends on how private market partici-
pants view the longer run behavior ofthe exchange
rate. Expectations of the exchange rate over the
longerrun, in turn, are tied to expectations of the
central bank's desired exchange rate objectives.
Cqusider>uow how expectations of the exchange
rate for the Canadian dollar and Deutschemark in
relation to the U.S. dollar changed after October
1979.
Charts 2 and 3 describe the bilateral exchange
rates for Germany and Canada, respectively,
ag~inst the U.S. dollar, together with the evolving
tennstructure of exchange rate expectations. The
tenn structure ofexchange rate expectations can be
roughly captured by assuming that the compounded
interest differential between two fixed-term finan-
cial assets with different currency denominations
approximates the expected percentage change in the
exchange rate over the maturity ofthe asset. 12
The U.S. dollar had depreciated substantially
against the Deutschemark from early 1976 through
the fall of 1979. In early 1976, interest differentials
between U.S. and German government bonds sug-
gested that the DM/$U.S.rate was expected to
remain around 2.6 OM/$U.S., with some modest
depreciation over the long run. It was not untiUate
1977, when the U.S. dollar had depreciated rather
steadily for two years against the OM that the
DM/$U.S. exchange rate term structure changed
considerably. The long-term outlook then was that
the U.S. dollar would depreciate steadily against
the OM, reaching a 2.0 DM/$U.S. rate by the end
of 1987. The long-run view of the U.S. dollar in
relation to OM, measured by a ten-year horizon,
continued to worsen in 1978 and 1979. The DM/$U.S.
rate was expected to fall to nearly I.5 by 1987.
Chart 1
Treasury Bill and Treasury Bond Rates
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14During the Fall of 1980, the U.S. dollar started a
rapid climb against DM. Interestingly, even given
the major appreciation ofthe U.S. dollar, DM was
still expected to appreciate against the dollar over
the long-run. Market participants apparently did not
expect the levels the U.S. dollar reached against
DM to be sustainable. Even by late 1982, when a
2.5 DM/$U.S. rate was reached, the longer-run
view was for DM to appreciate towards 2.0. Market
participants were expecting the German central
bankto pursue policies overthe long-run that would
result in a major appreciation of DM against the
U.S. dollar. Overall, the impression one obtains
from Chart 2 is that during the period ofthe major
depreciation ofDM against the U.S. dollar-1980
through 1982-the market expected the German
central bank tofollow policies that would result in a
longer-run appreciation ofthe Deutschemark.
The case of Canada is· in many ways different
from that of Germany. While the U.S. dollar was
depreciating against DM from 1976. to the Fall of
1979, the U.S. dollar appreciated significantly
against the Canadian dollar ($C) during the same
period.• In addition, a major depreciation of the
Canadian dollardid not follow the rise in U.S. rates
latein 1979 to the end of 1980. The $C/$U.S. rate
averaged 1.16 in September 1979 and 1.197 in
December 1980. Both short-and long-runexpecta-
tions ofa depreciation oftheCanadian dollar exist-
ing prior to October.1979 continuedto persistafter
that date. The only exception was the term structure
ofthe expectedexchange rate as ofDecember 1980,
which slopes downward; it implies a $C apprecia-
tion. In general, Chart 3 implies that the Candian
dollar was expected to depreciate even further after
October 1979. It cannot be argued, however, that
Chart2
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*Expected exchange rate teml structures are calculated from Decemberdata.
15expectations ofa Canadian dollardepreciation were
results, or indeed closely associated with, the
change in Federal Reserve operating procedures.
The picture that emerges from Charts 1-3 is that
the rise in V.S. interest rates, across the entire term
structure·after October 1979, appear related to the
considerable depreciation of the Deutschemark
against the V.S. dollar, but not, at least through
1981, with a similar depreciation of the Canadian
dollar. Despite actual exchange rate movements,
market participants expectedDM to appreciate after
1979 overseveral years, but they thought $C would
depreciate. The German central bank appears to
have been expected to resist a long-run depreciation
of its currency against the V.S. dollar, even after a
major depreciation occurred. Thus, "strong cur-
rency expectations" might be used to describe the
sequence of the term structure of exchange rate
expectations seen in Germany. "Weak currency
expectations" could be used to describe the ex-
pected exchange rate term structure for Canada; its
currency was expected to depreciate against the
U.S. dollar even during a period of relative ex-
change rate stability.
Studying the term structures of·exchange rate
expectations permits us to conjecture whether the
financial market might think short-run interest rate
movements in a large nation like the U.S. contains
information that could .signaFfuture .interest··rate
movements, short- and long-run, in othercountries.
Such a linkage between short-term interest rates in
the V.S. and long-term rates in another country are
likely to occur iffinancial markets perceive that the
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16rency within a given range in relation to the U.S.
dollar. The term structure ofexchange rate expecta-
tions viewed in Charts 2 and 3 imply that a rise in
short-term interest rates in the U.S. is not likely to
worsen the long-run view of the DM/SU.S. rate,
even ifthe Deutschemark depreciates in the short-
run. Individuals in the post-1979 period apparently
did not expect the U.S. dollar to remain strong. We
may surmise that the •Bundesbank is viewed as
unwilling to permit a "permanent'.' depreciation of
its currency against the dollar, where permanent
means lasting for more than five years. In contrast,
in the Canadian case, the rise in U.S. rates after
October 1979 and the subsequent depreciation
of the Canadian dollar was expected to lead to a
"permanent" depreciation, in spite ofthe fact that
the Bank of Canada resisted a depreciation of the
Canadian dollar after the change in U.S. monetary
control procedures.
These conjectures imply that short-term rate
movements in the U.S. after October 1979 were
likely to affect German long rates. If this were not
the case, Chart 2 would have shown the expected
DM/SU.S. term structures sloping upward. That is,
expectations of a weak DM in the future would
imply that U.S. short-rates could move without
being followed by similar movements in German
interest rates. The "strong currency expectations"
effectively linked German long-rates to U.S. short-
rates. The "weak currency expectations" for the
Canadian dollar may have broken such a link. The
empirical analyses will decide whether these link-
ages in fact resulted after October 1979.
It is. important to note, finally, that a clear case
cannot be made from Chart~i.2and 3thatachange in
the term structure·of exchange rate expectations
occurredshortly afterOctober 1979. In the German
case, .we see an upward sloping term struc-
ture in December 1976 reversing and sloping down-
ward in December 1977. In the Canadian case, all
exchange rate term structures, save one, remain
upward sloping.
While visual evidence may not demonstrate that
exchange rate expectations changed after October
1979, it is possibleto determine statisticallyhow the
rise in U.S. short-term rates may affect foreign
long-term rates. Our expectation is that German
long-term rates will rise with a rise in U.S. short
rates but Canadian long-term rates will be unaffect-
ed because of the market view that the Canadian
authorities would allow the Canadian dollar to ab-
sorb fUlly the impact of U.S. interest rate changes
and not intervene in the foreign exchange market or
adjust domestic interest rates in response. In other
words, the market thought thatthe Canadianauthor-
ities did not have an exchange rate objective.
I\J. Term Structure Interdependence: The Empirical Evidence
The estimation ofEquation (10) for Germany for
the period 1973.03 to 1979.09 is seen in Table I.
During this period the Federal Reserve may be
interpreted as having had amonetarycontrol regime
which placed primary emphasis on the management
of the Federal funds rate. Policy-induced varia-
tions in this rate were designed to influence the
domestic demand for money and credit. The depen-
dent variables in the Table I regressions are the
change in the average market yields on bonds ofthe
German federal government (including the Federal
Railways and Post Office) for maturities ofone to
ten years. The explanatory variables are the change
in the three-month German interbank rate and the
unanticipated change in the three-month U.S. Trea-
sury bill rate. 13
The results ofTable I confirm the hypothesis that
changes in the longer-term German bond rates were
17
influenced primarily by movements in German
short-term rates priorto October 1979. The contem-
poraneous change in the German three-month inter-
bank rate has a statistically significant impact on
bond yields extending from maturities ofone to five
years; the remaining maturities showed little sensi-
tivity to the change in the German interbank rate.
Table I also suggests that the unanticipated
change in U.S. short-term interest rates had no
impact on Germanlong-term rates. The coefficients
on the unanticipated change in the U.S. three-
month bill rate are consistently statistically insignif-
icant and very small.
When the German term structure equations were
estimated over the period following the change in
Federal Reserve operating procedures, the results
were drastically different. Estimated over the peri-
od 1979.12 to 1982.12, we found considerablyreduced significance for the coefficients on the
German three-month interbank rate. As shown in
Table 2, only in the first three maturity classes is the
German interbankrate statistically significant at the
5 percent level for a one-tail test.
Contrary to the results for the earlier period,
we find in Table 2 that the coefficient on the
unanticipated component of the three-month U.S.
Treasury bill rate was significant throughout the
German term structure. An unanticipated one per-
centage point increase in the U.S. three-month bill
rate was found to have increased one-year German
rates by about 20 basis points. Quite surprisingly,
this impact does not die out the longer the maturity
of the asset. The "surprise" of a one percentage
point rise in U.S. short rates appears to have lifted
the entire German term structure by about 17-22
basis points. U.S. short-term interest rate "sur-
prises" therefore appear to have contained more
relevant information about future German short
rates than in the earlier sample period.
Another surprising result in Table 2 is the im-
provement in explanatory power of the equations
over those seen in Table I, particularly for the longer
maturities. Forty to fifty percent ofthe variance in













German Term Structure Equations in Response





RHO D.W. SER 6.r~ Z t
.000 .372 .145 -.20 189 2.01 .463
(01) (4.43) (1.32) (-1.79)
.002 .159 .006 .44 .365 2.21 .250
(.04) (2.62) (.12) (4.40)
.006 .136 -.011 .15 .136 2.07 .278
(-16) (2.07) (-.19) (1.34)
.005 .145 -.040 .36 .237 2.14 .237
(-12) (2.57) (-.84) (3.39)
-.011 .132 -.004 .23 .144 2.07 .250
(-.29) (2.32) (-.08) (2.14)
-.010 .074 -011 .35 .162 2.02 .234
(-25) (1.32) (-.23) (3.32)
.009 .090 .038 .27 108 2.04 .254
(-23) (1.54) .71) (2.47)
-.007 .060 -.057 .30 .099 2.10 .244
(-.17) (1.05) (-1.13) (2.77)
.010 .069 .035 .178 .039 2.06 .264
(-.28) (1.17) (-.61) (1.61 )
-.008 .133 .040 .025 .027 1.99 .362
(-.18) (1.79) (.48) (.22)
+ AUS.
Dependent Variable is the change in the German "longer-term" bond rate. (Z ) is the set ofresiduals from the following regreSSIOn
for the U.S. three-month Treasury bill rate, on a bond-equivalent basis:
rUS- .136+ 1?9?rlJS 0315rlJS +ZAUS t - .- - .t- I . 1"-2 I
(2.23) (25.58) (-6.23)
R
2 = .969; DW. 1.86; SER = .625
Sample period: 1953.06-1983.01
In all cases t-statistics appear in parentheses. r* is the rate on 3-month interbank loans in the Frankfurt am Main money markets.
18matuntles is explained for the 1979.12-1982.12
period, compared with only 3 to 16 percent in the
pre-October 1979 sample period. For example,45
percent ofthe variance inthe change in the ten-year
German rate is now accounted for by the equation,
compared with only 3 percent in the earlier sample
period. Ifone relied on the expectations hypothesis
to explain German long-term rates, expectations of
future German short rates would ~ppear to have
been greatly influenced by unanticipated move-
ments in contemporaneous U.S. short rates. 14
To determine whether U.S. rates over the term
structure were influenced by unanticipated changes
in German short-term rates, Equation (10) was esti-
mated for U.S. Treasury securities with maturities
of I, 3, 5, 7, IO and 20 years. We used the change
in the U.S. three-month Treasury bill rate and
the unanticipated component of the German three-
month interbank rate as explanatory variables.
Table 3 reveals that German interest rate "sur-
prises" had no statistically significant impact on
U.S. rates, with allcoefficients intheGermaninter-
est rate surprise variable clearly insignificant at
conventional significance levels.
Moreover, the coefficients on the change in the
U.S.· three~month bill rate do not appear to have
changed greatly between the two sample periods,
although U.S. interestrates were consider-ably more
variableinthe post-October 1979 period, as seen by
thelarge increasein standard errors. These results
may be interpreted as suggesting that in both peri-
ods German short-term interest rates contained no
information ofuse in forming expectations offuture
U.S. short-term interest rates. U.S. monet~pol­
icy, in this sense, appeared "independent" ofinter-
est rate and exchange rate policy in the Federal
Republic ofGermany.
Using data on Canadian government securities,
where the Canadian short-term rate is the three-
month Treasury bill yield, we estimated Equation
Table 2
German Term Structure Equations in Response
















RHO Ff D.W. SER Z t
~.028 .382 .203 ~.05 .414 2.00 4.87
(-37) (3.30) (4.20) (-.33)
~.028 .254 207 .14 .480 1.91 .408
(-.35) (2.52) (5.06) (.87)
-.025 .186 .221 .20 .519 1.89 .383
(-.32) (1.96) (5.77) (1.21 )
.020 .160 .220 .18 .529 1.88 .366
(-.27) (1.76) (6.02) (1.11)
-.012 .151 .209 .14 .509 1.90 .358
(-.18) (1.71 ) (5.82) (.84)
-.012 .153 .209 .09 .520 1.94 .347
(-.20) (1.80) (6.02) (.53)
-.013 .093 .197 .22 .504 1.87 .337
(-.19) (I. 10) (5.87) (1.35)
-.015 .076 .189 .23 .480 1.88 .339
(-.21) (.90) (5.60) (1.43)
.011 .090 .182 .159 .463 I.91 .334
(~.16) (1.09) (5.44) (.98)
-.010 .095 .176 .131 .455 1.94 .326
(-.15) (I. 18) (5.39) (.80)
19(10) for the four maturity segments ofthe Canadian
term structure, with maturity breakdowns of 1__3,
3-5,5-10 years and 10 years and over. Theesti-
mated regressions appear inTable4.
Thetwo Canadiansample periods are the same as
those in the German case, the floating rate period
before and after October 1979 ending in 1982.12.
The regressions for the earlier period showthat the
unanticipated <:;hanges in the U.S. Treasury bill rate
significantly influenced Canadian longer-term in-
terest ratesov.el'the entiretermstructure, unlike the
German case forthe same period. WhileCanadian
shortrates alsohad asignificanteffectonthatcoun-







U.S. Term StructureEquations inResponse
to Unanticipated German InterestRate Movements+
Explanatory Variables
us AG ar, Z D.W. SER
.006 .793 .049 -.08 .734 2.00 .228
(.23) (15.14) (-.88) (-.70)
3 .006 .483 .092 -.05 .505 2.01 .227
(.25) (9.21) (-1.64) (-.45)
5 .010 .362 .091 .01 .439 2.01 .198
(.45) (7.86) (-1.86) (09)
7 .015 .284 -.071 .07 .392 2.00 .176
(.71) (6.95) (-1.63) (.66)
10 .019 .218 .054 .07 .324 1.98 .155
(1.01) (6.07) 1.40) (.59)
20 .016 .201 .028 .05 .341 1.98 .135
(.98) (6.40) (-.85) (.48)
Sample Period
1979.12-1982.12
.010 .714 089 .14 .862 1.88 .513
(-.10) (1428) (71) (.86)
3 .019 .477 .147 .13 .699 1.87 572
(.18) (8.57) (1.06) (83)
5 .022 .376 .129 .16 .611 1.83 .557
(.20) (6.91) (.96) (1.00)
7 .028 .319 .083 .13 .515 1.88 .564
(.26) (5.82) (60) (.77)
10 .029 .287 .060 .14 .497 1.88 .522
(.29) (5.64) (.48) (89)
20 .034 .247 .046 .19 .447 1.86 .503
(.34) (5.00) (.38) (1. 17)
+ Dependent Variable is the change in the U.S. longertenn bond rate.(;p) is the set ofresiduals from the following regression forthe
German three-month interbank rate:
G G G AG r, = .188+ 1.414r'_I- .44lr'_2+Z,
(1.96) (21.46) (-6.69)
R,2 .971; DW 2.08; SER = .526
Sample period: 1967.10-1982.12
20Canadian three-month bill rate tapered off signifi-
cantly the longer the maturity ofthe government
security considered.
It has been argued that Canadian interest rates
following October 1979 were "more influenced by
swings in U.S. rates than were those ofthe Euro-
pean countries and Japan." 15 The results in Table 4
for the post-October 1979 period provide some con-
firmation ofthis opinion. Unlike the earlier period,
changes in the three-monthCanadian Treasurybill
rate had no statistically significant impact on Cana-
dian bond rates beyond the 1-3 maturity class. We
found that the unanticipated U.S. short-rate vari-
able is significant primarily at the short-end of the
maturity spectrum and that the coefficients are
larger than in the earlier sample period. Whereas
in the pre-October 1979 period an unanticipated
change of 100 basis points in the U.S. bill rate
would raise Canadian 1-3 year rates by about 16
basis points, the effect in the post-October 1979
period was 25 basis points.
The impact on longer maturities also was consid-
erably larger. In fact, the coefficients on the U.S.
interest rate surprise variable forthe second sample
period were larger and more significant than the
coefficients on the Canadian short-rate variable for
all but the shortest maturity. It is interesting to note
that after the change in U.S. monetary control pro-
cedures, the impact on Canadian and German term
structures ofa 100 basis point "surprise" increase
in the U.S. three-month Treasury bill rate Were
quantitatively not that different. An unanticipated
one percentage point increase in the U.S. bill rate
causes a rise in both German and Canadian five-
year bond rates ofabout 20 basis points. Expected
future short-term Canadian rates appear to have
been strongly influenced by U.S. rates after Octo-





Canadian Term Structure Equations in Response
to Unanticipated U.S. Interest Rate Movements+
Explanatory Variables
AUS








10 years & over
.019 .829 .161 -.06 557 2.00 .272
(-.64) (8.92) (2.49) (-.52)
.019 .691 .140 .14 558 1.95 .227
(-.81) (9.29) (2.54) (-1.23)
-.022 591 .161 -.09 .485 2.02 .235
(-.85) (7.50) (2.84) (-.83)
-.004 .381 .101 -.04 .469 1.98 .157






10 years & over
-.055 .344 .256 .01 .410 1.99 .923
(-.35) (2.10) (2.05) (.08)
.037 .229 .252 -.06 .273 2.02 .989
(-.24) (135) (1.89) (-.39)
.001 .195 .212 .05 .288 2.01 .811
(-01) (1.39) (1.94) (-.33)
.023 .165 .182 .07 .240 2.01 .775
(.19) (1.25) (1.74) (-.45)
+ Dependent Variable is the change in the Canadian "longer-term" bond rate. t-statistics in parentheses.
21also extends to the lack of significance ofthe Ger-
man or Canadian short-term rate except for. the
shorter maturities.
To test the hypothesis that U.S. rates were influ-
enced by unanticipated Canadian short-term rates,
we estimated Equation (10) with U.S. rates as the
dependent variable. The resultsforthepre-October
1979period suggests thatthe financial marketscon-
sidered unanticipated movements in Canadian rates
to carry useful informationaboutfutureU.S. short
rates. This is quite plausibleifthe U.S. central bank





U.S. Term.Structure Equations •.in.Respcmse







-.017 .712 .388 -.13 .786 2.03 .204
(-.80) (14.23) (4.43) (-1.l4)
3 -.009 .411 .292 .06 .545 2.00 218
(-.39) (768) (3.10) (-.51)
5 -.004 .302 .259 -.02 .480 1.99 .191
(-.17) (6.44) (3.13) (-.18)
7 .003 .239 .213 .04 .432 1.98 .170
(.17) (5.75) (3.89) (.38)
10 .010 .183 .157 .07 .355 1.96 .151
(.54) (4.97) (2.40) (.65)
20 .007 .169 .150 .06 .392 1.95 .130
(.44) (5.34) (2.66) (.56)
Sample Period
1979.12-1982
-.018 .659 .116 .17 .864 1.81 .509
(-.18) (8.70) (1.02) (1.08)
3 .010 .415 .136 .17 .699 1.78 .572
(.08) (4.87) (1.06) (1.07)
5 .015 .328 .105 .20 .610 1.76 .558
(.13) (3.96) (.85) (1.22)
7 .021 .277 .089 15 .517 1.83 .562
(.19) (3.29) (.69) (.93)
10 .023 .245 .088 .16 .502 1.84 .520
(.22) (3.17) (.75) (1.01)
20 .032 .236 .025 .21 .446 1.83 .504
(.31) (3.17) (.22) (1.29)
+ Dependent Variable is the change in the U.S. "Ionger-tenn" bond rate. ('2;C) is the set ofresiduals from the following regression for
the Canadian three-month Treasury bill rate:
rC= .081 + 1.388 rT_1 C AC , .400r'_2 + Z
(1.96) (29.33) (-8.45)
-,
R- = .986; DW = 1.97; SER .471
Sample period: 1951.03-1982.12
22tive in relation to the Canadian dollar. Given the
long history ofnear parity between the two curren-
cies, such a result is not surprising. Nonetheless,
there is little evidence in policy records to suggest
that the U.S. monetary authorities had such an
exchange rate objective.'6 In the post-October
1979 period, the Canadian interest rate surprise
coefficient is much smaller and insignificant in
all equations.
Putting the results ofTables 4 and 5 together, one
is ledto the conclusionthatin the post-October 1979
period, financial markets viewed the Bank ofCan-
ada as being strongly influenced by unanticipated
movements in U.S. rates. U.S. rate movements
were, in a sense, good leading indicators of future
Canadian short-term rates underthe assumptionthat
the Bank ofCanada had some exchange rate objec-
tive with regard to the U.S. dollar. Thus, the results
for Canada in the post-October 1979 period are
similar to those found for Germany: unanticipated
movements in U.S. interest rates provided useful
informationin forming expectations of future
foreign short-term interest rates, expectations
which were then translated to the foreign long-term
bond markets.
v. Summary and Policy Implications
The empirical results above suggest that, follow-
ing the October 1979 adoption by the Federal
Reserve ofalternative monetary policy control pro-
cedures, the Federal Republic of Germany found
that its financial markets were more "tied" to U.S.
financial markets than before. One could interpret
the results as suggesting that the linkage emerged
because of strong expectations that the German
central bank would not permit a long-run currency
depreciationagainst the U.S. dollar. In this manner,
expected future short-term interest rates in Ger-
many were strongly influenced by changes in U.S.
short-termrates. This linkage depends ona reliance
on the expectations theory ofthe term structure and
the assumption that international interestrate differ-
entials approximate expected rate changes.
Section Ill's analysis suggested that even during
significant OM depreciation from 1980-1982, fi-
nancial markets expected OM to appreciate against
the dollar five to six years into the future. This
implies that ifthe U.S. were to follow a tight mone-
tary policy which in the short-run might lead to
higher short-term rates, German monetary policy
would follow the U.S. lead. Thus, U.S. rates ap-
peared to have influenced the entire German term
structure because of expectations that the German
central bank would not permit a long-run deprecia-
tion ofits currency against the U.S. dollar.
Canada was pictured in Section III as having
"weak currency expectations" in the sense that
interest rate differentials implied a long-termdepre-
ciation of the Canadian dollar. Nonetheless, the
statistical results suggest that unanticipated interest
23
rate movements in the U.S. continued in the post-
October 1979 period to result in substantial in-
creases in Canadian interest rates across the term
structure. Contrasting these two facts, the empirical
results of Table 4 with Chart 3, suggest that even
though the Canadian dollar was expected to depre-
ciate overthe long run, the BankofCanadaresisted
any furtherdepreciation. That is, despite a "weak"
currency, the exchange rate objectives ofthe Bank
ofCanada were as strong as Germany's.
The results ofSection IV also revealed that there
was a substantial rise in both German and Canadian
short-termrates following the October 1979 Federal
Reserve policy move. Indeed, as noted in a Federal
Reserve staff study of the effect of the new mone-
tary control procedures, when the Bank ofCanada
raised its Bank Rate on October 9, 1979, Governor
Bouey mentioned the change in Federal Reserve
operating procedures as part of the reason for the
rate increase. With respect to Germany that Federal
Reserve staffstudy argued that,
"...when dollar interest rates rose, German
interest rates seemed to rise in response, but
the rise in German interest rates seemed to
be based on domestic considerations, as was
noted by the Bundesbank at the time....In
sum, authorities incontinentalEuropeancoun-
tries wereaffeGtedbythe newoperatingproce-
dures; they were affected by both the higher
level and, toa much lesserextent, the volatility
of U.S. interest rates. However, the problems
caused were not great, given that internal and
external objectives were broadly consistent.Any problems stemmed primarily from Ger-
many policy actions and conflicts and were
thus at most only indirectly related to the Fed-
eral Reserve's new operating procedures .17
Ifthe private market thinks that the central bank
has a long-run objective of not accepting a higher
rate ofinflation via a major depreciation of their
currency, short-term rates in the country pursuing
strong anti-inflation objectives cali become a "de-
tenninant" oflong-term rates in foreign countries.
Such a linkage, in our view, is firmly based on
expectations of the long-term objectives of the
central bank.
The empirical results above imply that following
October 1979 the new "linkage" between German
and U.S. financial markets arose because private
financial markets viewed the German central bank
as having a strong anti-inflation objective and that it
would, in the long-run, link DMto the dollaras long
as the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank shared
the same long-term inflation objectives. Indeed, in
the post-October 1979, German financial markets
appearas closelylinked to U.S. financial markets as
werethose ofCanada. 18
Atthe policy level, a country whose long-term
rates are linked to another country's short-term rate
via expectations ofthe central bank's long-run ex-
change rate objectives is one which, to some degree
at least, has lost the independence floating ex-
change rates were thought to promise. The exis-
tence of an international business cycle through
suc;1l interest rate linkages becomes more plausible
and may be a reason to promote greater coordina-
tion ofinternational monetary policies.
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